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Institutionalizing from the Middle:  
Understanding Provincial Legislation and Grassroots Democracy in China 
INSTITUTIONALIZING FROM THE MIDDLE    2 
Abstract 
 Nominal democratic institutions under non-democratic regimes vary across countries.  This 
study intends to advance our understanding of such nominal democratic institutions by exploring 
the role of one aspect of the regime, government hierarchy. Focusing on the village-level 
democratization in China, we stress the intermediary role of the provincial-level governments in 
shaping the variant outcomes of grassroots democracy across the country.  Through an analysis 
of a national sample, we find that divergent provincial legislative interpretation of central 
policies is a key determinant of the access to power and democratic governance of village-level 
governments.  Our finding suggests that authoritarian states can employ various institutions to 
gather more accurate information, accommodate local variations, contain potential 
intra-government disagreement and thus maintain regime stability.  
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Institutionalizing from the Middle: Understanding Provincial Legislation and Grassroots 
Democracy in China 
 Recently, increasing scholarly interest has been devoted to nominally democratic institutions 
in authoritarian regimes (Boix and Svolik 2013; Magaloni 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2010; 
Wright 2008).  Rather than treating elections and legislatures as mere window-dressing, this 
³institutional turn´ in the studies of authoritarianism proposes that nominal democratic 
institutions are important to the survival and stability of authoritarian regimes.  Yet a major 
challenge in comparative studies of such institutions is that they vary tremendously across 
authoritarian polities (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).  Any cross-national generalizations thus 
tend to leave the specific micro-logics of these democratic institutions less wel1-articulated 
(Malesky and Schuler 2010).  This is particularly true in China, where a large number of 
nominal democratic institutions are in place, but their political effects remain understudied. 
 Unlike many other authoritarian regimes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has only 
introduced competitive elections at the village level.  Over the last two decades, both 
well-designed case studies and survey research (mostly based upon locally representative 
samples) have been devoted to assessing the quality and development of rural democracy. 
However, scholars disagree about how to assess Chinese grassroots democracy (Alpermann 2009; 
Kennedy 2002; Li 2002; Manion 1996, 2009, 20152¶%ULHQ and Han 2009; Tan 2006; Zhong 
and Chen 2002).  The development of village democracy in China appears to be highly 
idiosyncratic and village-specific, defying any easy generalizations. And there is inadequate 
effort to systematically account for the variation of village-level democracy. 
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 In this study, we believe that one way to advance scholarly understanding about grassroots 
democratization in China is to examine the relationship between grassroots democratization and 
the regime hierarchy.  In particular, we highlight the intermediary role of provincial-level 
governments in China¶s party-state.  This intermediary role renders provincial governments 
pivotal in formalizing and thus conditioning how rural democracy is implemented.  Divergent 
provincial legislative interpretations of central policies provide the regime with an institutional 
channel to gather more accurate information, accommodate local variation, and limit potential 
intra-government disputes.  Therefore, legislations at the provincial level strongly shape the 
variant outcomes of village democratization at the grassroots level.  
 Using a national sample of provincial legislation and village democracy (for details, see the 
Appendix A), this study reveals a considerable variation in efforts and in ways by provincial 
governments to institutionalize village democracy.  To assess the influences of such aggregate 
provincial-level institutional factors, we employ a multilevel (i.e., village level and province 
level) hierarchical model that includes both provincial and village level factors and controls for 
the effect of unspecified provincial level factors.  We consistently find that variations in the 
provincial contexts, particularly variations in the formal legislation, strongly shape the 
institutionalization of village democracy at the grassroots level.   
 This study contributes to our understanding of grassroots democratization in China in 
particular and that of authoritarian politics in general.  First, by examining how grassroots 
democracy is differently formalized by the various provincial governments and is unevenly 
implemented by the grassroots agents, the study shows how center-provincial institutional 
5 
arrangements help accommodate local variations.  Second, we advance studies of village 
democratization in China by highlighting how varying provincial contexts intersect with village 
characteristics to condition the institutionalization of grassroots democracy.  We thus provide a 
useful perspective to understand why villages across rural China demonstrate seemingly 
inconsistent and idiosyncratic patterns of democratization.  Together, our findings suggest that 
authoritarian regimes may employ a complex of institutions to solve the dual dilemmas of 
maintaining popular support and contain internal disagreement.  A comprehensive 
understanding of the resilience of authoritarian regimes therefore requires a thorough 
investigation of the micro-logics of these institutional complexities. 
 The next section briefly reviews the legislative role of provincial governments in 
implementing grassroots democracy. We then examine the variations in provincial legislation on 
grassroots democracy.  In order to examine the impacts of provincial legislation on village 
democracy, we operationalize both electoral institutions and governing institutions and evaluate 
the effects of various village- and provincial-level correlates by using multilevel hierarchical 
models.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and political implications of 
our ¿QGLQJV  
 
I. Grassroots Democracy in Rural China: Inducing Mass Support 
 
 Grassroots political institutions in rural China have undergone dramatic changes since Mao.  
During the Mao era, the functions of village government were largely carried out by appointed 
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party secretaries who held a monopoly over critical collective resources (e.g., land).  Since the 
onset of the post-Mao reforms, however, this mode of rural governance has become increasingly 
unsustainable.  After decollectivization of agricultural production and abolition of the commune 
system, party secretaries lost their direct control over collective properties, and, as a consequence, 
their role in governing village affairs was seriously undermined.  Meanwhile, economically 
empowered villagers became increasingly resistant to malfeasances by local cadres and 
unpopular state policies (e.g., compulsory grain procurements, taxes and fees, and birth control 
policies).  In a word, the post-Mao reforms not only unleashed rapid economic development but 
also created an unexpected dilemma for the CCP regime in terms of winning and maintaining 
support from the empowered peasants.   
 In recognition of this problem, the central government has introduced a new set of 
institutional arrangements in rural China to adapt the grassroots governmental system to the new 
socio-political changes.  The new grassroots rural system is anchored in the Village Committee 
(VC).  According to the Organic Law of Village Committees (OLVC) promulgated by the 
central government in 1987, the VCs are mass organizations of self-government at the rural level.  
Elected by the villagers, officials on the VCs are responsible for administering rural 
socio-economic and political affairs, especially the provision of public goods.  The central 
government saw the VCs as an effective and efficient means to address the deterioration in rural 
governance because the elected officials on the VCs would enjoy greater support from villagers 
and would act in a more accountable manner than those cadres who were appointed during the 
Mao era.  Final promulgation of the Organic Law in 1998 marked the beginning of the central 
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JRYHUQPHQW¶Vefforts to grant more autonomy to the VCs as a solution to the deterioration in 
Chinese rural governance.   
 Ever since its introduction, grassroots democracy in rural China has attracted considerable 
attention.  Despite agreement on the critical importance of grassroots democracy to our 
understanding of the resilience of the CCP regime, scholars have not reached a consensus as to 
whether such grassroots democracy encourages democratization or consolidates CCP 
authoritarian rule (Alpermann 2009; Kennedy 2002; Manion 2¶%ULHQ and Han 2009; 
Zhong and Chen 2002).  The large amount of evidence accumulated from earlier studies 
provides mainly inconsistent, if not contradictory, information about the overall status and 
patterns of village democratization.   
 As argued by Manion (2009), the problem in part has a lot to do with the substantial regional 
variations throughout the country.  Although studies focusing on factors at the village level help 
explain grassroots sources of village democratization in China, they fall short in revealing the 
impact of the subnational contexts in which the grassroots democracy evolves.  Thus in this 
study, we aim to explore the institutional sources of variations in China¶s grassroots 
democratization.   
 
II. Divergent Patterns of Institutionalization of Village Democracy: Accommodating Local 
Variation and Containing Intra-government Disagreement 
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 Under the seemingly uniform framework of the national OLVC, how can we explain the 
considerable variations in the development of village democracy across rural China?  Are such 
variations solely a function of village-level factors?  Or do they also reflect certain fundamental 
characteristics of the institutional arrangements in the CCP regime?  We argue that the 
central-provincial arrangements in the CCP regime significantly condition implementation of 
important policies, such as village democracy.  Though usually perceived from a holistic 
perspective, the regime is generally divided over major policies.  Rather than resolving the 
disagreements forcefully in the national deliberative or decision-making bodies, more often than 
not the CCP regime leaves some thorny issues to the provincial governments and allows for 
divergent provincial interpretations and implementations of national policies.  This downward 
transfer of power and authority not only renders implementation of national policies subject to 
the will and interests of both the national and the provincial governments.  It also helps the 
regime to monitor popular preferences, address the local variations like levels of socioeconomic 
development and thus reconcile potentially conflicting priorities within various segments in such 
a large-size countries as China (Chung, 1995; Huang 1996; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995; 
Naughton and Yang 2004; Remick 2002; Solnick 1996).  In light of this, this downward 
delegation provides the regime an alternative channel to gather information through local 
variations in policy implementation and innovation (Manion 2015). 
 Despite the pivotal role of provincial governments in the party-state hierarchy, the impact of 
provincial governments on village democratization has not yet been adequately examined.  This 
study emphasizes the impacts of provincial institutional contexts on the development of village 
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democratization.  In light of this, institutionalization of village democracy does not mean that 
the national OLVC is carried out automatically or uniformly across the various regions.  Rather, 
the OLVC introduces a new dimension of center-local dynamics that leads to variations in 
grassroots democratization.   
 One way to explore the influence of the provincial institutional context, we argue, is to 
examine provincial legislation.  In a departure from the Mao era, the ³reform Constitution´ (i.e., 
the 1982 Constitution) HQGRZHGWKHSURYLQFLDOSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHV33&VZLWKlegislative 
power that previously had been under the control of WKH1DWLRQDO3HRSOH¶V&RQJUHVV13& (Art. 
100, 1982).  This new center-province balance of power reflected the Center¶Vbroader attempt 
WRSURPRWHDQGIRUPDOL]H³ERWKFRQWURODQGIOH[LELOLW\ and both national unity and local 
HIILFLHQF\´&KXQJ 2011; Lin 1992).  Since then, PPCs have been granted power to enact 
detailed regulations regarding implementation of national laws as well as to initiate their own 
provincial legislation.  In both cases, provincial legislation can create a relatively separate and 
stable subnational institutional environment within the provincial jurisdiction (Cho 2006; Lin 
1992; 2¶%ULHQ; Wang 2014).   
 How, then, was village democracy formalized by the national and provincial governments in 
China?  At the national level, political elites in the CCP regime were divided as to whether and 
to what extent village democracy should be implemented.  This is because there was only 
limited available information about popular preferences and such local variations as 
socioeconomic development.  Although many argued that grassroots democracy was the only 
solution to the deterioration in rural governance, opponents contended that villager autonomy 
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was ³an example of µbourgeois liberalization¶´ that would endanger the party¶s ability to rule (Li 
and 2¶%ULHQ: 132).  Given the intra-party disagreements, the national OLVC adopted 
ambiguous language and explicitly delegated to the PPCs authorities to make specific 
stipulations on critical issues, for instance, on the relationship between the VC and the village 
party branch (VPB) (Alpermann 2009; Guo and Bernstein 2004; Li 1999): 
 
7KHVWDQGLQJFRPPLWWHHVRIWKHSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVHVRISURYLQFHVDXWRQRPRXV  
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may, in accordance 
with this Law and in light of the conditions in their own administrative regions, 
formulate measures for the implementation of this Law. (Italics added by the author; see 
Art. 29 of the OLVC.)   
 
Therefore, provincial-level governments are formally charged with responsibility to adopt rules 
and procedures regarding village democracy and are provided with ample space to interpret the 
OLVC and to promote their own initiatives.  The pivotal role of provincial governments thus 
allows various segments of the regime to affect the actual implementation of the OLVC.  On the 
one hand, provincial legislation may be instrumental for different national agencies (Cho 2006; 
Chung 2011; Lin 1992).1  For instance, Shi (1999) found that the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MoCA) often lobbies the PPCs to promote more reform initiatives.  On the other hand, 
legislation at the provincial level introduces various provincial and local government agencies 
into the legislative contestation and coordination.  In most cases, sluggish and vague provincial 
legislation best serves the interests of local governments since more detailed provincial 
                                                             
1 It is interesting to note that this strategy is also common in economic legislation (see Lin 1992; 
Cho 2006; Chung 2011).   
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legislation leaves less leeway for county and township governments to intervene and manipulate 
village affairs at their will (Zhao and Guo 2007).  As a result, the institutionalization of the 
OLVC is a product of constant interactions between national and lower-level governments 
2¶%ULHQ6KL).   
 
III. Provincial Legislation on Village Democracy 
 
 After the promulgation of both the provisional and the formal OLVC, the standing 
committees of the PPCs across the country began to draft their own legal documents on village 
democracy, including various regulations (tiaoli), rules (banfa), and opinions (yijian).  These 
documents are anchored in two key pieces of provincial legislation, electoral regulations (ERs), 
mainly with respect to the rules and procedures for VC elections, and implementation regulations 
(IRs), mainly with respect to post-electoral village governance.  For this reason, we focus 
primarily on the ERs and the IRs to explore the variations in provincial legislation.   
 Rather than following the same styles and formats, IRs and ERs issued by the PPCs vary 
across provinces in important ways.  In this study, we choose to examine the following three 
dimensions: the time of introduction of the provincial IRs and ERs, the authority relationship 
between the VC and the VPB, and the transparency of village management (cunwu gongkai).  
First, these three dimensions of provincial legislation are not only broadly comparable but they 
are also closely related to the VC elections and village governance at the grassroots level.  
Second, the three areas capture key variations in provincial legislation with respect to the OLVC.  
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Third, the three areas encompass the differences between the IRs and the ERs in terms of both 
content and timing.  Thus, they can provide a comprehensive picture of the provincial 
legislation.   
[Figure 1 is about here.] 
[Figure 2 is about here.] 
 
A. Time sequence of the Provincial IRs and ERs 
 As demonstrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, there is considerable variation in terms of how soon 
different provincial governments introduce their own formal IRs and ERs through the PPCs.  
Take a provincial IR as an example: After final promulgation of the OLVC by the NPC on 
November 4, 1998, a mere twenty-three days later (on November 27, 1998) the Standing 
Committee of the Guangdong PPC passed its IRs.  In contrast, it took over five years for the 
Jilin PPC to finalize its IRs (i.e., on March 1, 2004).  Moreover, at the time of this research, 
neither Qinghai nor Tibet had yet enacted their own provincial IRs.  Further examination of the 
provisional IRs, provisional ERs, and formal ERs also indicates wide variation in terms of the 
timing of their promulgation.   
 In at least three ways, the timing of the IRs and ERs can strongly affect the quality of village 
democratization.  First, the amount of time it takes to enact IRs and ERs reflects the relative 
importance that the provincial political elites attach to rural democracy.  If promoting grassroots 
democracy is regarded as a high-priority issue, provincial IRs and ERs will be passed relatively 
quickly.  Second, as noted by many China scholars, by drafting and amending bills the PPCs 
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can help coordinate the conflicting organizational interests among the various government 
agencies (Cho 2006; Xia 2008).  Prolonged legislative processes, therefore, indicate strong 
departmental and local opposition to implementation of the OLVC, which in turn has a negative 
impact on the development of rural democracy.  Third, the earlier that provincial IRs and ERs 
are promulgated, the longer villagers are exposed to more detailed regulations on VC elections 
and the more experience they will have with democratic governance.  In sum, provinces with 
earlier provincial IRs and ERs are in a better position to advance grassroots democracy.   
 
B. The Authority Relationship between the VC and the VPB 
 A main obstacle to grassroots democratization in rural China is penetration of the party-state 
via the VPB (Alpermann 2001; Guo and Bernstein 2004; O'Brien and Han 2009; Oi and Rozelle 
2000; Tan and Xin 2007).  Ever since introduction of the VC elections, the exercise of VC 
power has been strongly influenced by the village party secretaries.  As agents of the party-state, 
party secretaries are more responsive to upper-level governments than they are to the VCs.  
Therefore, the prominence of the VPB in village affairs can endanger village self-governance.  
While the early tugs-of-war between the VCs and the VPBs in village governance  were usually 
played out informally, recent party penetration of the VCs has been increasingly institutionalized, 
particularly through concurrent office-holding (yijiantiao), that is, the party secretary also 
presides over the chair of the VC office (Guo & Bernstein 2004; O'Brien & Han 2009).  This 
overlapping of personnel, many have ZRUULHG³PLJKWOHDGWRDUHWXUQRIXQIHWWHUHGUXOHE\3DUW\
EUDQFKHV«WKXVPDking village elections FORVHWRPHDQLQJOHVV´2
%ULHQand Han 2009: 374).  
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 As the guiding document on village self-governance, the 1998 OLVC remains quite 
ambiguous in terms of the authority relationship between the VCs and the VPBs.  While stating 
that the VPB is the village ³OHDGHUVKLSFRUH,´the OLVC also insists that the 93%VKRXOG³VXSSRUW
the villagers and ensure that they carry out self-governance and exercise their democratic rights 
GLUHFWO\´  7KLVGLDOHFWLFVWDWHPHQWas discussed earlier, can be attributed to the disagreements 
among the national leadership with regard to how to balance the relationship between party 
control and grassroots democracy.  As a result, provincial governments have reacted in differing 
ways, GLVSOD\LQJDQLQWHUHVWLQJ³WULSOHPL[´pattern (Chung 2000).   
[Figure 3 is about here.] 
As demonstrated in Fig. 3, the first and largest group consists of WKH³EDQGZDJRQLQJ´SURYLQFHV 
Among the twenty-nine provinces that issued IRs, twenty adopted similar or simply the same 
ambiguous statement as that in Article 3 of the OLVC and were reluctant to take their own 
position on the relationship between the VCs and VPBs.  However, a second group of four 
³SLRQHHULQJ´SURYLQFHV² i.e., Gansu, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan ² did not follow 
the emphasis in the OLVC on the VPBs¶ ³OHDGHUVKLSFRUH.´  When addressing VC autonomy, 
their provincial IRs did not mention the party, implicitly suggesting their adherence to the reform 
JRDORI³VHSDUDWLQJpDUW\IURPJRYHUQPHQW´dangzheng fenkai) (Guo and Bernstein 2004, 272).  
The last group of five provinces were ³UHVLVWDQW´to loosening party control over the VCs.  
6SHFLILFDOO\+HEHL*XDQJGRQJ6KDQGRQJ7LDQMLQDQG;LQMLDQJ³FKRVHWRH[SOLFLWO\VXEMHFWWKH
elected village committee under Party EUDQFKµOHDGHUVKLS,¶OHDYLQJQRXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWZKRLVWR
call WKHVKRWVLQYLOODJHJRYHUQDQFH´ (Alpermann 2009, 401).   
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 Anecdotal evidence indicates the strong impact of provincial regulations on VC-VPB 
relations.  In 2001, 57 elected VC chairs in Shandong, one of the ³resistant´ provinces, resigned 
en masse in protest against the VPB¶s intervention in village affairs (Eckholm, 2002; Zhou, 
2001).  This unusual collective protest, though receiving some national attention (e.g., in the 
People¶s Daily), did not make any breakthrough since senior officials referred to the provincial 
legislation as the guideline to resolve VC±VPB disputes.  In another resistant province, 
Guangdong, it has been found that concurrent office-holding has significantly undermined the 
role of the VC in village affairs (Zhao and Guo, 2007).  Here we hypothesize that provincial 
legislation on the VC-VPB relationship is strongly correlated with the actual autonomy of the 
VC.  Specifically, we expect that there are more party-dominant villages in the ³UHVLVWDQW´
provinces and less party-dominant villages in the ³SLRQHHULQJ´SURYLQFHV 
 
C. Transparent Village Management 
 Even if the VC is democratically HOHFWHGDQGH[HUFLVHVSRZHULQGHSHQGHQWO\³LWGRHVQRW
necessarily follow that village JRYHUQPHQWLVGHPRFUDWLF´ (Chan 1998, 518; Alpermann 2001; 
O'Brien and Han 2009).  The quality of village self-governance is also determined by how 
effectively village government is monitored and supervised by ordinary villagers.  As a measure 
to institutionalize the YLOODJHUV¶ULJKWWR³GHPRFUDWLFVXSHUYLVLRQ´transparent village 
management (cunwu gongkai) is stipulated in the 1998 OLVC.  Key village affairs, e.g., 
financial issues and land distribution, must be publicized at least twice annually.  It is hoped 
that more transparent village management will effectively reduce malfeasance by rural cadres 
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and thus advance village democracy. 
[Figure 4 is about here.] 
 Since the OLVC is explicit about implementation of transparent village management, no 
provincial government has chosen WRWDNHD³UHVLVWDQW´SRVLWLRQ  +RZHYHUthe provinces have 
been divided as to whether to promote the institutionalization of democratic supervision a step 
further.  As revealed in Fig. 4, even though sixteen provinces maintained the original 
requirement stated in the 1998 OLVC, thirteen provinces decided to pioneer by mandating that 
the VC should publicize critical village issues at least four times a year rather than twice.  
Comparing Fig. 4 to Fig. 3, we do not see much overlap in the two dimensions of provincial 
legislation with regard to village governance.  This indicates that a stipulation on party 
involvement or even party dominance does not necessarily correlate with less or greater 
willingness of the provincial governments to have more transparent village management. 
Although there are few survey studies examining the relationship between provincial regulations 
and village management, some field studies indicate that provincial regulations and village 
management tend to bear a strong correlation (Yu 2008).  We thus expect that there are more 
transparent villages in terms of finances in provinces that are more supportive of implementation 
of transparent village management.   
 
IV. Measuring the Quality of Grassroots Democracy in Rural China 
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 Thus far, we have found that there are considerable variations in provincial legislation 
regarding the OLVC, and we expect that these differences will be correlated with different 
dimensions of grassroots democracy in rural China.  Based on a 2006 nationwide survey 
sponsored by the MoCA (for more details, see the Appendix), this study empirically examines 
the impact of provincial legislation on village democratization.  When assessing grassroots 
democracy in rural China, scholars are divided as to whether to focus on electoral institutions 
LH³DFFHVVWRSRZHU´RUWRH[DPLQHDFWXDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIYLOODJHJRYHUQDQFHLH the 
³H[HUFLVHRISRZHU´ (Alpermann 2009; Lu 2012; Manion 2009; O'Brien and Han 2009).  Here 
we do not assume that the two approaches are mutually exclusive, and thus we examine both the 
access-to-power and the exercise-of-power dimensions of village democratization. 
 
A. Access to Power: Electoral Institutions 
 Although the 1998 OLVC provided very detailed instructions on how VC elections should 
be carried out, actual implementation varied considerably across the country (Lu 2012; Manion 
2009).  Localities varied in terms of organizing their village election committees, nominating 
candidates, finalizing formal candidates, and casting votes, thus defying an easy assessment of 
rural electoral institutions in China. WHIROORZ/X¶V(2012) strict approach to evaluate the quality 
of electoral institutions.  Specifically, we examine whether a village fulfilled all four 
requirements mandated by the 1998 OLVC when implementing its most recent VC election.  To 
provide a better view of how VC elections were implemented in the villages surveyed by the 
MoCA in 2006, ZHFRQWUDVW/X¶VILQGLQJVZLWKRXU own in Table 1.   
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[Table 1 is about here.] 
 As demonstrated in Table 1, our results are consistent with those of Lu (2012).  Although 
candidates were nominated through the sanctioned procedures in a majority of villages (76 
percent) and adopted multiple-candidate elections (91 percent), less than half (48 percent) did not 
violate the rules in organizing the election committees and only about one-third (37 percent) 
followed the 1998 OLVC in deciding upon the formal candidates.  As a whole, less than 
one-sixth of the surveyed villages fulfilled all the requirements stipulated by the 1998 OLVC.  
To avoid our analyses being driven by the choice of a particular measurement, we used both a 
binary variable and a summary index to operationalize the village electoral institutions.  
The most obvious, important, and easily 
measured index of progress in democratization is electoral competitiveness-the number of 
candidates on the ballot relative to the number of offices  
Coded one if electoral data are available, zero otherwise. 
bExcess candidates divided by number of positions (coded zero if data are unavailable) 
 
 
Since more than one measure could be used at some stages of VCEs, in order to 
evaluate the quality of electoral institutions rigorously I have strictly assessed 
each procedure against the OLVC. Any measure not officially sanctioned by 
the revised OLVC was coded as a violation 
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B. Exercise of Power: The Governing Institutions 
 To gauge the quality of post-electoral governance, we focus on the following three 
dimensions: the independence of the personnel on the VC, the autonomy of the VC in 
decision-making, and the existence of village supervision groups (VSGs).  The relevance and 
importance of these three dimensions to village self-governance have been confirmed by prior 
studies on rural democratization in China.  Moreover, these three dimensions are closely related 
to our identified variations in provincial legislation.  Thus we believe that the three dimensions 
can provide a reliable test of the impacts of provincial legislation on village governance.   
 VC Independence. The independence of the VC, as discussed earlier, has been penetrated by 
the party-state via a more institutionalized form, that is, concurrent office-holding (Guo and 
Bernstein 2004; 2¶%ULHQand Han 2009).  Although fieldwork and local sample-based surveys 
suggest widespread overlapping of personnel, there have been no empirical studies based on a 
national sample to investigate this practice (Manion, 2009; O'Brien and Han 2009, 372).  Our 
study gauged VC independence by examining when a village party secretary held any position 
(including that of chair, vice chair, or member) of the VC.  As demonstrated in row 1 of Table 2, 
234 out of the 362 surveyed villages (64.6 percent) did not have concurrent office-holders.  
Therefore, the results suggest that in contrast to popular impression, a majority of villages still 
maintain relatively independent VCs at the moment of the survey.   
[Table 2 is about here.] 
 VC Autonomy.  Even when it is independent from the VPB, the VC is not always the only 
seat of decision-making in a village.  Oi and Rozelle, for example, find that the locus of power 
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in a village is contingent upon its underlying economic structure (Guo and Bernstein 2004; 
O'Brien and Han 2009; Oi and Rozelle 2000).  In many localities, the VPB still plays a key role 
in managing critical village affairs, for instance, financial issues.  If this is the case, one 
expected outcome would be less transparent village management since party secretaries 
appointed by upper-level party branches are less restrained by transparent village management 
regulations.  In light of this, VC autonomy in deciding on important issues like financial matters 
may serve as an important indicator of village self-governance.  Here we operationalized VC 
autonomy by examining whether the VC is the only body involved in managing village financial 
matters.  The results are reported in row 2 of Table 2.  In more than 40 percent of the surveyed 
villages, party secretaries still have a great deal of influence on the popularly elected VCs in 
terms of managing village affairs, thereby causing many scholars to worry about the resurgence 
of party control.   
 Village Supervision Group (VSG).  In order to ensure implementation of transparent village 
management, the 1998 OLVC encouraged ordinary villagers to form specialized supervision 
groups ² licai xiaozu and cunwu gongkai jiandu xiaozu ² to monitor the publication of the 
9&V¶ financial accounts and other important documents. (Alpermann 2009).  Moreover, 
introduction of the VSGs also facilitates YLOODJHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGLQYROYHPHQWLQYLOODJH
affairs.  Therefore, the existence of such groups is conducive to better village-government 
performance.  For the purpose of operationalization, we created a binary variable by examining 
whether there is a VSG in the surveyed village.  The results (row 3, Table 2) suggest that a 
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majority of villages (85 percent) had created a 96*LQGLFDWLQJYLOODJHUV¶HQWKXVLDVPto 
participate in village governance.   
 
V. Model and Analysis 
 
 In order to explore the impact of provincial legislation on rural democratization, we employ 
a multi-level hierarchical approach in our primary analyses.  Specifically, we use a two-level 
(i.e., village-level and province-level) mixed-effects model with random effects clustered at the 
provincial level.  Multilevel modeling is suitable for our analysis for two reasons.  First, the 
causal relationship of our concern (i.e., provincial-level legislation and village-level democracy) 
is cross-level in nature, and our data is hierarchical in structure, with village-level data nested in 
provincial units.  Second, while we are able to identify the primary causal factor (i.e., provincial 
legislation) and other factors of village democracy at the provincial level, there are many other 
potential factors that are not specified but associated with the differences across provinces. 
Including random effects at the aggregate level helps controlling for the effect of unobserved 
provincial level factors.  
[Table 3 is about here.] 
 Table 3 presents the results of analyses of village electoral institutions. Model 1 and Model 2 
do not include the provincial-level institutional variables that are of primary interest.  A 
comparison of the two models shows that few village-level factors influence electoral institutions, 
but provincial differences (i.e., the size of the rural population and the share of urban residence) 
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strongly shape the development of electoral institutions in rural China.  The difference between 
the two models also suggests that without taking into consideration the explanatory variables at 
both levels, our understanding of grassroots democracy will be incomplete, if not highly biased.   
 The results of Models 3, 4,  5, and 6 suggest that only the length of time since promulgation 
of the provincial ERs is strongly correlated with high-quality VC elections at the grassroots level, 
and the impact of the ERs is persistently significant regardless of the specific measurement of the 
village electoral institutions.  This is because the 1998 OLVC provides relatively detailed 
stipulations on specific procedures for VC elections (Lu 2012; Tan 2004), leaving little room for 
adjustments by the provincial ERs.  Therefore, the length of time since the year of promulgation, 
rather than the content of the ERs, is likely to serve as the main source of variation in village 
electoral institutions.  However, because the OLVC is limited and vague about village 
governance, it is the variation in the content of the provincial IRs that is likely to affect the 
exercise of power in rural China.   
 In addition, a comparison of Models 2 and 4 reveals that once the number of years since 
enactment of the provincial ERs is added to the analysis, the significant impact of the number of 
years since the first VC election at the village level diminishes.  This implies that with regard to 
the quality of village electoral institutions, village-level factors, even institutional factors, do not 
matter a lot in comparison to the provincial institutional context.  Therefore, the national pattern 
of village electoral institutions is highly clustered, contingent upon the year of promulgation of 
the provincial ERs.   
[Table 4 is about here.] 
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 We present the effects of provincial institutions on village democratic governance in Table 4.  
For each of the three governance dimensions, we include in the model only the provincial 
institutional variables that have a meaningful and direct relationship with that dimension.  First, 
with respect to VC independence in its relation to the VPB (Model 7), a suggestion of VC 
leadership in provincial legislation significantly increases the probability of strong VC 
independence compared to the other two situations.  And if provincial legislation does not spell 
out a definite relationship between the VC and the VPB, the VCs in that province on average 
enjoy greater independence than those where party leadership is clearly stated, but less than in 
those where VC leadership is formally promulgated.  In sum, these findings suggest that the 
provincial government¶VVWDQFHRQWKHDXWKRULW\UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQthe VC and the VPB 
strongly shapes the overlapping of personnel between the two institutions at the grassroots level. 
 With regard to the autonomy of the VC (Model 8), our analyses indicate that provincial 
legislative stipulations about the VC±VPB relationship do not have a significant influence.  But 
a further requirement in the provincial IRs, that village affairs should be publicized four times a 
year, significantly improves VC autonomy in terms of managing village affaires.  One possible 
explanation is that the OLVC explicitly mandates that the VC is responsible for managing village 
affairs and that important issues (such as financial matters) should be publicized in a timely 
manner.  Stricter and more meticulous requirements about democratic management of village 
affairs tend to increase the costs of intervention by party officials in village governance and thus 
tend to reduce their incentives to do so.   
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 Finally, none of the provincial-level variables, including the institutional variables, has any 
significant effect on whether or not there is a VSG in the village (Model 9).  For this dependent 
variable, only the level of economic development seems to make a difference.  Given the high 
stakes held by village officials, peasants in the wealthier villages have stronger motivations to 
more closely monitor and supervise village financial affairs.   
 
VI. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
In this research, we are inspired by the basic understanding that while studying the political 
institutions of authoritarian states, we should not limit our attention to national institutions.  The 
eventual political outcomes of institutions in authoritarian countries, as in democratic countries, 
are jointly shaped by the role of political elites and institutions at both the national and local 
levels.  6SHFLILFDOO\ZKHQDVVHVVLQJDQGDQDO\]LQJ&KLQD¶VUXUDOGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQwe should 
take into consideration the role of intermediary governments in the Chinese state.  The Chinese 
state is highly decentralized and fragmented.  Provincial governments, as agents of the Center 
and the principals of lower-level governments, play a pivotal role in &KLQD¶V bureaucratic chain 
by modifying various state policies through their discretionary legislation or policy 
implementation and by taking new policy initiatives based on the situation and development of 
local affairs.   
 The findings emerging from this study suggest that in addition to being affected by various 
factors at the grassroots level, village democratization is also a function of the dynamic 
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interactions between the Center and lower-level governments.  ³/RFDOVHJPHQWVRIWKHVWDWH
DSSDUDWXV´DVnoted E\5HPLFN³DUHQRWPHUHO\ZHDNHURUGLOXWHGYHUVLRQVRIWKHFHQWUDOVWDWH 
on the periphery´ (Remick 2002: 401).  Instead, they tend to have their own institutional 
interests and varying kinds of relationships with their local societies.  Therefore, when 
advancing the institutionalization of rural self-governance, villages across the country are 
embedded in different subnational contexts.  This not only reaffirms the need for more 
systematic and comparative research (Manion, 2009), but also highlights the necessity of 
introducing a more integrated perspective on the development of village democracy.   
 Our empirical findings have mixed implications for the future development of village 
democratization.  On the one hand, although village democracy was initiated bottom-up by the 
peasants, once it was accepted as national policy, its implementation, as many have worried, 
increasingly became a top-down process (or, as suggested by our study, a province-down 
process).  Therefore, conservative provincial elites can effectively thwart the development of 
village democracy.  On the other hand, it should be noted that there is considerable variation at 
the provincial level, and there are still many provinces that are willing to pioneer in advancing 
rural democratization.  Given their greater proximity to local residents, the modifications, 
alternations, and initiations made by provincial-level or other subnational-level governments 
constitute the bottom-XSG\QDPLFVRI&KLQD¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHP  7KHVHJRYHUQPHQWVLIHQGRZHG
with benign intentions, can effectively reflect the need and demand of villagers and promote the 
further development of democracy in rural China.  Such a mixed prospect for grassroots-level 
democracy is characteristic of China¶s decentralized authoritarian regime.   
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Appendix A: The MoCA Survey 
 
 The village-level data used in this study are drawn from MoCA¶ nationwide survey of China 
Rural Self-governance Survey (zhongguo nongcun cunmin zizhi zhuangkuang diaocha), which 
was carried out by the Chinese Academy of Social Science China from 2005 to 2006.  In this 
survey, the samples were selected with a combination of probability proportional to size (PPS) 
and multistage sampling techniques.  In the first stage, county-level units were selected within 
each provincial unit using the PPS technique, in which the probability of selection is proportional 
to the population VL]HRIWKHSURYLQFHEDVHGRQ&KLQD¶VFHQVXVGDWD  ,QWKLVVDPSOLQJVWHS
a total of 130 county-level units were randomly chosen.  In the second stage, a total number of 
260 township-level units were randomly selected from the 130 country-level units.  In the third 
stage, within each township-level unit, two villages or residential communities were randomly 
selected, and a total of 520 village-level units (i.e., urban residential communities and VCs) were 
randomly selected, in which there were 370 villages.  In the fourth stage, one village official of 
each selected village was interviewed using the village-level questionnaire, and 371 of 375 
questionnaires were completed, with a response rate of 98.9%.  Current and retired high school 
teachers were emSOR\HGDV¿HOGLQWHUYLHZHUV  They had been trained by project members in 
¿HOGLQWHUYLHZLQJWHFKQLTXHVEHIRUH the actual survey.   
 The key sociogeographic attributes of the sampled villages as well as socioeconomic 
attributes of provinces are described in Table A1.   
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Table A1. Descriptives of Key Sociogeographic and Socioeconomic Variables  
 
Variable 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Village-level variables 
     
Distance to township site (km) 368 6.23 6.38 0 45 
Geographical accessibility1 367 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Village population (×10-3) 368 2.27 1.83 0.23 18.90 
N. of natural villages 367 4.24 5.26 1 43 
Income per capita 363 7.61 0.96 0 9.55 
<HDUVVLQFH¿UVWHOHFWLRQ 349 14.33 6.65 0 27 
Rounds of elections 364 5.21 2.07 0 14 
 
Provincial-level variables      
Rural population (×10-6) 31 29.96 21.57 2.27 75.50 
Percentage of urban residents 31 28.13 13.56 12.78 63.08 
Average disposable income of rural 
  household (×10-3) 
31 3.51 1.60 1.88 8.25 
Notes:  31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities are included.   
1 Villages with no access to public transportation (i.e., railway station, bus stop, and ferry terminal) is 
coded as ³0´, otherwise ³1´.   
 
Sources:  Village-level data is from MoCA 2006.  Provincial-level data is from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2006.   
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Appendix B: Detailed Information about Provincial Legislation 
 
Table 1.  Provincial Legislation on Village Self-Governance 
Year of 
Provisional 
IR 
Year of 
Provisional 
ER 
Year of 
IR 
Year of  
ER 
VC-VPB 
Leadership1 
Cunwu 
Gongkai2 
Anhui 1992 NA 19993 19993 Ambiguous Yes 
Beijing NA 1998 2001 2000 Ambiguous No 
Chongqing NA 1998 2002 2001 Ambiguous Yes 
Fujian 1988 1990 20003 20003 Ambiguous Yes 
Gansu 1989 NA 2000 1998 VC No 
Guangdong NA NA 19983 19983 VPB No 
Guangxi NA NA 2001 NA4 Ambiguous Yes 
Guizhou 1989 1995 1999 1999 Ambiguous No 
Hainan NA NA 2001 2001 VC Yes 
Hebei 1990 1993 1999 19993 VPB No 
Heilongjiang 1990 1996 2001 19993 Ambiguous Yes 
Henan 1992 1998 2001 NA4 Ambiguous No 
Hubei 1989 NA 2001 19993 Ambiguous Yes 
Hunan 1989 1996 1999 2000 Ambiguous No 
Inner 
Mongolia 
1992 1997 20003 NA4 VC No 
Jiangsu 1994 1992 20013 2000 Ambiguous No 
Jiangxi 1994 NA 1999 NA4 Ambiguous No 
Jilin 1991 1997 2004 2000 Ambiguous Yes 
Liaoning 1990 1994 2000 20003 Ambiguous Yes 
Ningxia 1992 1997 2000 2000 Ambiguous No 
Qinghai 1990 NA NA 1999 NA NA 
Shaanxi 1990 1996 1999 1999 Ambiguous Yes 
Shandong 1992 NA 2000 1998 VPB Yes 
Shanghai NA NA 2000 19993 Ambiguous Yes 
Shanxi 1991 NA 1999 2005 Ambiguous No 
Sichuan 1991 NA 2001 2003 Ambiguous No 
Tianjin 1991 NA 2001 19993 VPB Yes 
Tibet 1993 NA NA 20023 NA NA 
Xinjiang 1991 NA 2001 19993 VPB No 
Yunan NA NA 1999 19993 VC No 
Zhejiang 1988 1997 1999 19993 Ambiguous No 
34 
Notes:  31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities are included.  Hainan became a province 
in 1989, and Chongqing became a municipality in 1997.   
1 The authority relationship between VC and VPB specified in provincial regulation (as of May 2005, 
EHIRUHWKHVXUYH\ZDVFRQGXFWHG³9&´VWDQGVIRU9&OHDGHUVKLS³93%´VWDQGVIRU93%OHDGHUVKLSDQG
³$PELJXRXV´VWDQGVIRUDPELJXRXVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLS   
2 Whether ³transparent village management´ is required on a quarterly base in IR.   
3 Regulations has been revised later.  An extended version of the table is available online.   
4 Specific requirements on electoral procedures and rules are included as part of IR.   
 
Sources:  Compiled by the authors from documents published by the MoCA and PPCs.  Also see Table 
1, Kin-6KHXQ/RXLH³9LOODJH6HOI-governance, p. 138; Table 1, %M|UQ$OSHUPDQQ³,QVWLWXWLRQDOL]LQJ
9LOODJH*RYHUQDQFH´, pp. 399-400.   
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Table 1.  Village Committee (VC) election following the 1998 OLVC: A Comparison of Two National 
Samples 
 CASS 2005 
(N. = 379) 
MoCA 2006 
(N. = 368) 
Organization of village election committee 49% (183) 48% (176) 
Nomination of candidates 76% (287) 76% (279) 
Finalization of formal candidates 37% (140) 37% (135) 
Multiple candidates 91% (345) 91% (335) 
Electoral institution as a whole 17% (63) 16% (60) 
Notes:  Raw frequencies in parentheses.  An extended comparision will be available online.   
 
Sources:  For CASS 2005, see Table 2, Lu 2012 and MoCA 2006.   
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Table 2.  Measuring Post-Electoral VC Governance 
N. Percentage Total Obs. 
VC Independence 234 64.64 362 
VC Autonomy 208 57.62 361 
Village Supervision Groups 312 85.01 367 
   
Sources:  MoCA 2006.   
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Table 3.  Analyses of Quality of Electoral Institution of Village Committee 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
(OL) (MLL) (MLL) (MLL) (MLOL) (MLOLS) 
Village-level variables 
     
 
Distance to township site  -0.012 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.0062 
  (km) (0.016) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.0098) 
Geographical accessibility 0.036 0.065 0.072 0.083* 0.047 0.023 
 
(0.028) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.031) (0.016) 
Village population (×10-3) -0.091 -0.15 -0.14 -0.18 -0.10* -0.05 
 
(0.057) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.059) (0.032) 
N. of natural villages 0.0064 -0.034 -0.037 -0.049 -0.0058 -0.0021 
 
(0.018) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.021) (0.012) 
Income per capita 0.19* 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.29 0.18* 
 
(0.11) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.18) (0.094) 
<HDUVVLQFH¿UVWHOHFWLRQ 0.035 0.098* 0.094* 0.066 0.029 0.013 
 
(0.027) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.029) (0.016) 
Rounds of elections -0.072 -0.28 -0.26 -0.20 -0.074 -0.033 
 
(0.086) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.093) (0.051) 
Provincial-level variables 
     
 
Rural population (×10-6) 
 
0.031** 0.037*** 0.016 0.010 0.0061 
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.0089) (0.0046) 
Percentage of urban  
 
0.088*** 0.10*** 0.076*** 0.050*** 0.025*** 
  residents 
 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.023) (0.016) (0.0082) 
Average disposable income 
 
-0.27 -0.31 -0.27 -0.19 -0.11* 
  of rural household (×10-3) 
 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.12) (0.063) 
Years since provincial IR 
  
0.18 
  
 
   
(0.17) 
  
 
Years since provincial ER 
   
0.32** 0.20** 0.10** 
    
(0.15) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 
 
-17.3** -20.0** -21.9** 
 
-3.94 
  
(8.39) (8.62) (9.16) 
 
(3.05) 
Cut 1-4 (Omitted)       
     
  
AIC 968.9 305.0 300.8 263.1 838.9  
BIC 1011.2 351.1 350.6 311.2 898.2  
Notes:  OL: Ordinal logistic; MLL: multilevel logistic; MLOL: multilevel ordinal logistic ; MLOLS: 
Multilevel ordinary least square.  In Model 1, 5, and 6, the summary index of village electoral 
institutions is used as the dependent variable (ordinal variable: 0-4), and the binary measurement is used 
in Model 2, 3, and 4. Model 6 treats ordinal variable as continuous.  Entries of MLL and MLOL are 
restricted maximum OLNHOLKRRG5(0/FRHI¿FLHQWVDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJVWDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHV 
38 
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, and *p< 0.1.  Descriptives of control variables are reported in the Appendix (Table 
A1).  Omitted and additional analytical results will be available online.   
 
Sources:  Author-compiled dataset in which village-level data is drawn from MoCA 2006. 
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Table 4.  Multilevel Logistic Analyses of Village Governance 
 
Model 7. Model 8 Model 9 
VSG 
 
VC Indep. VC Auto. 
Village-level variables 
Distance to township site  0.011 -0.022 0.0026 
  (km) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028) 
Geographical accessibility -0.025 0.00037 -0.048 
 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.047) 
Village population (×10-3) 0.12 0.089 0.011 
 
(0.097) (0.086) (0.12) 
N. of natural villages -0.034 0.040 0.035 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.043) 
Income per capita -0.28 -0.089 0.51** 
 
(0.22) (0.17) (0.22) 
<HDUVVLQFH¿UVWHOHFWLRQ 0.075* 0.026 -0.038 
 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.052) 
Rounds of elections -0.22 -0.029 0.062 
 
(0.23) (0.12) (0.17) 
Provincial-level variables    
Rural population (×10-6) -0.0028 -0.013 -0.0018 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Percentage of urban  -0.060* -0.0045 -0.0085 
  residents (0.033) (0.025) (0.032) 
Average disposable income 0.60** -0.10 0.31 
  of rural household (×10-3) (0.26) (0.18) (0.22) 
VC-VPB relationship in provincial IR1   
  VC leadership 2.83** -0.34 
 
(1.16) (1.05) 
  Ambiguous leadership 1.55*** 0.13 
 
(0.57) (0.63) 
Cuwu Gongkai by quarter in  0.84* 0.28 
  provincial IR (0.44) (0.45) 
Years since provincial IR -0.064 
 
(0.19) 
Constant 1.23 0.62 6.06 
 
(7.48) (7.13) (8.84) 
    
AIC 405.5 443.5 286.0 
BIC 459.0 500.7 339.6 
40 
Notes:  All models are multilevel (two-level) mixed effects model with random effects at the provincial level. 
Entries DUHUHVWULFWHGPD[LPXPOLNHOLKRRG5(0/FRHI¿FLHQWVDQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJVWDQGDUGHUURUVLQ
parentheses).  ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, and *p< 0.1.  Descriptive statistics of control variables are reported in 
the Appendix (Table A1).  Additional analytical results will be available online.   
1 ³93%OHDGHUVKLS´LVXVHGDVWKHUHIHUHQFHJURXS   
 
Sources:  Author-compiled dataset in which village-level data is drawn from MoCA 2006.   
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Figure 1.  Provincial Promulgation of IRs 
 
This figure illustrates the time sequence of the introduction of implementation regulations 
(IRs) among all provincial governments. Blue regions progmulgated IRs during 1998-1999; 
gray regions did it during 2000-2001; and red region 2002-2004.
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Figure 2.  Provincial Promulgation of ERs 
 
This figure shows the time sequence of promulgate Electoral Regulations (ERs) among all 
provincial governments. Blue regions progmulgated ERs during 1998-1999; gray regions 
did it during 2000-2001; and red region 2002-2004.
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Figure 3.  Provincial Variations in Authority Relationship between VC and VPB 
 
This figure illustrates different relationship between village committee (VC) and village 
party branch (VPB) as coded in provincial implementation regulations (IRs). Red regions 
emphasize party control; blues regions relax part control; and gray regions use ambiguous 
language similar to the national legislation.
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Figure 4.  Provincial Variations in Transparent Village Management 
 
Thi figure illustates the extent to which provinvial regulations mandate transperent village 
management. Red regions follow the national regulation that important village affairs 
should be published twice  ayear; blue regions impose a higher standard, requring 
publication of village affairs four times a year.  
